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PANEL 3: BANKRUPTCY & RESTRUCTURING OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Moderator: Barry E. Adler
Panelists: William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein,
Hon. Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael H. Krimminger,
Edward R. Morrison

Barry Adler: Thank you all for being here. It is an honor
for me to be on this panel and an honor to moderate it. Let
me introduce our panel before we get started. William A. Ackman, the founder and CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management; Marsha Goldstein, a partner and chair of the business finance and restructuring department at Weil, Gotshal;
the Honorable Arthur Gonzalez, a judge in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York; and Ed
Morrison, the Harvey Miller Professor of Law and Economics
at Columbia Law School. Also on this panel is Mike Krimminger, and we're honored to have him here. Mike is a Special Advisor for Policy to the Chairman of the FDIC. I saved
him for last because he is going to speak first, and I'll start him
off with three questions.
What is a non-bank financial institution, and what is systemic risk? We hear both of those terms a lot. Also, does the
former affect or cause the latter?
Michael Krimminger: Thank you. I have to do my usual
disclaimer that I try to represent the views of the FDIC but
don't take everything I say as necessarily representing the views
of the FDIC or of my boss.
I would like to tum for a second from the questions you
asked and just look at why we're here and why we're talking
about some resolution authority that's different from the
bankruptcy code for non-banks. To define what a non-bank
financial firm is will depend on the final legislative language,
but its obviously not an insured depository institution because
that's covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. It's a financial institution effectively that's subject to heightened supervision under the provisions of either the House Bill or
some future Senate Bill, so the actual parameters of that still
remain to be defined.
241
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As for what systemic risk is, I hate to quote Justice Potter
Stewart but I'm tempted to. It really is a situation-you kind
of know it when you see it-but it certainly is a situation where
you are potentially facing the collapse of the financial system
based upon the inability to deal with certain types of contracts
or certain types of exposures or loss of credit intermediation; a
loss of liquidity in the system. I think for purposes of proposal
for resolution authority, one way of defining systemic risk is
probably just to use the language of the statute, which is, to
paraphrase because I don't have it in front of me, that the
systemic risk which would require the appointment of a receiver under this proposed resolution authority would be a
risk whereby there would be a conclusion by the regulators,
that putting an institution into an insolvency proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Code would create a systemic risk.
The default, or the recognized way in which virtually every
institution will be resolved would be under the Bankruptcy
Code. It would only be under that very rare circumstance
where there is a conclusion that a normal bankruptcy resolution would create systemic risk that there would there be an
exception.
Barry Adler: What legislation are you referring to?
Michael Krimminger: There was a bill passed by the
House of Representatives in December 2009-the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Essentially it went
through many iterations and it was designed to provide for financial reform. One of the points I would make in looking at
this is that we have to look at the idea of a resolution authority
for that rare case outside the Bankruptcy Code as being simply
part of a whole package, and that whole package involves a
number of things. It involves a creation of a Systemic Council
to look across risk that might be percolating up through different types of entities, that perhaps a particular regulator was
not addressing. I think there is a good case for that obviously,
because we saw a risk that percolated up from non-bank financial firms, non-bank lenders, for the subprime market through
their reliance upon securitization and the "originate to distribute model." That Systemic Council would be designed to
harmonize capital, leverage, and liquidity standards. You
would need to have a resolution authority. In addition, you
would need to have heightened consumer protections. As was
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evident in this crisis, the failure to provide for consumer protection also led to risk coming up in the system because our
experience has certainly been that any bank, or any nonbank
that for that matter, engaging in activities that aren't appropriate for consumers are likely engaging in a lot of other activities
that create risk for that institution, and potentially risk
throughout the system.
I think the reason that we're here is that the fall of 2008
demonstrated in a lot of ways that we need new options if we
are actually going to end "too big to fail." What we saw in the
fall of 2008 obviously was an example where there's been discussion at times about constructive ambiguity-about whether
the regulators would bail out a particular firm or not. The
ambiguity was resolved, not necessarily in a constructive way,
but there were things that had to be done because there
weren't the tools that were necessary to actually deal with some
of the problems.
Right now, I think in some ways we have maximum moral
hazard, a more concentrated system, and we still lack some of
the needed tools. That's one of the reasons why Congress is
taking a look at a financial regulatory reform right now. One
of the key things we need to do in order to squeeze out the
moral hazard that is now in the system-and clearly it has
been in the system for a long time-is that we need to end any
bailouts.
As Chairman Bernanke said repeatedly, we need to end
"too big to fail" and to do that we need to have a panoply of
tools. I mentioned a Systemic Council, improved consumer
regulation, improved macro prudential and micro prudential
supervision as well. We need to bring non-banks into some
level of supervision depending upon the risk they are presenting to the system. Particularly if they are the very largest institutions, they should be subjected to heightened standards so
that we can reduce that systemic risk.
I do not have a lot of knowledge about the details of what
the President is considering in the announcement yesterday,
but one of the concepts is reducing the size, interconnectedness, and complexity of financial institutions which can be
done in a variety of ways. One of things we've proposed is that
if you have a resolution authority, you might need to have a
resolution fund, and you might want to assess based upon the
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higher risk activities that firms engage in. That in and of itself
should make them operate more efficiently and effectively,
and should reduce complexity and perhaps size as well.
One of the things that I want to dispel is that the legislation is creating some type of permanent bailout, or providing
options for a government bailout. The whole purpose of what
we've been advocating is that, as part of this elimination of
"too big to fail," you need to eliminate the ability to provide
firm specific equity injections, or firm specific support, for
firm's that are in trouble. If a firm is in trouble and cannot
survive then it should be closed and go through an insolvency
proceeding, where shareholders and other creditors take
losses to protect the taxpayer from taking losses in the future.
If it needs liquidity, if there is liquidity support needed for the
marketplace as a whole, then we have certainly supported
things such as the Federal Reserve's 13.3 authority to provide
system-wide liquidity support, as well as actions that the FDIC
has taken, along with other regulators. We took, for example,
our Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which provided
a certain level of liquidity support by providing FDIC guarantees of certain debt issued by banks and their holding companies as well.
Focusing on the resolution authority piece, we need to
dispel the idea that some firms are simply too big or too interconnected to fail. We need to have a way to make sure that
they do fail and that the shareholders absorb losses. In order
to do that, we need to have an effective and credible resolution mechanism that provides for the orderly winddown of
banking and other financial enterprises without imposing
costs on the taxpayers. So the largest firms can be closed, we
can impose losses on the shareholders and creditors, and sell
the operations back to private firms. It needs to be quick, it
needs to be decisive, and it needs to provide for continuity to
prevent a systemic collapse; but only as a means to an eventual
liquidation or selling off of the assets of that firm and recycling
them back into the private sector. Certainly the resolution
scheme as a process should be transparent to have an established claims priority where stockholders, not taxpayers,
should be in the first-loss position with the obligation to minimize costs and maximize recoveries.
Most fundamentally, one of the things that can lead to
potential systemic tie-ups is the loss of liquidity in the system,
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which occurred in the fall of 2008. We need to be able to have
a power under the new resolution law to create something that
in the banking laws is called a "bridge bank"-it can be a
bridge financial firm in this case, so that in the rare emergencies where bankruptcy can't do the job, you can transfer operations and continue them in this bridge firm temporarily until
the market could establish an equilibrium and until we can
establish some continuity in the marketplace as a whole.
So that's overall the function of what we're trying to
achieve in the discussions that we've had under our resolution
authority. I would just note with regard to bankruptcy that it
does a very effective job for the vast majority of insolvencies
and we absolutely support the continuation of bankruptcy as
doing that. But what we've seen is that similar to banks, many
financial firms are dependant upon very short-term liquidityand very short-term liquidity can dry up very quickly. The benefit we have in banks so that short-term liquidity in deposits
doesn't dry up so quickly is deposit insurance. Certainly I
would not support the idea of having repo insurance or some
other type of insurance for short-term financial market obligations-I don't think anybody would. But since non-bank financial firms are subject to such quick liquidity 'runs', we
need to have the ability to maintain continuity at those types of
operations temporarily, and that would be through a sort of
bridge-firm type of structure.
In this type of systemic crisis, we also need insolvency
processes designed to help resolve claims, resolve the affairs of
the firm in the public interest, rather than solely just in the
creditor's interest, and we need to make sure that this is designed for quick action and allows for immediate transfers
over to the bridge bank without delay. Parties to financial
markets contracts would be protected in the bridge bank if
they're transferred there; if not, they can terminate and net
out their contracts just as they can today under current law.
So there will be protection for the financial markets in that
kind of structure as well. But that's really the goal of the resolution structure.

Barry Adler: Mike, you mentioned the moral hazard problem but at the same time suggested that the goal was not to
subsidize these firms when they fell. If there is no subsidy,
then there is no moral hazard problem, so is there really going
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to be no subsidy? That is, if by your account only liquidity is
going to be provided, but no out-of-the-money claims are going to get paid (because if there were no subsidy, that would
have to be the case), then how would this work as quickly as
you need it to work? So if CitiGroup and Chase collapse on
the same day and they enter into this resolution arrangement
that's outlined in the bill, according to the story you just told
what will happen is the FDIC or a governmental agency will
come and provide liquidity but not pay creditors who don't
deserve to get paid? How will the resolution authority know
which creditors deserve to get paid in order to do that quickly
and without subsidizing by paying in full claims that we're outof-the-money under an absolute priority regime, such as what
happened to AIG?
Michael Krimminger: Well, let's not be under a misapprehension that we did not have moral hazard when we relied on
the bankruptcy code to resolve these problems. We have a
moral hazard because when the Bankruptcy Code was the only
option it was not going to be used for the largest firms, so they
were going to be bailed out by the government
But what we're talking about now is trying to make sure
that we don't have a government bailout to support the shareholders, subordinated debt, and other types of creditors. If
you are trying to protect against a systemic collapse, that by
definition means that there are going to be some creditors
who are going to come out better than other creditors. For
example, if I am trying to make sure that the repo markets
don't collapse, and let's say a hypothetical institution is very
much a provider of liquidity and a key functionary in the repo
market, then I may have to do some rolling-over of the repos
that may require-even for those small amount of claims that
may be uncollateralized-providing some additional liquidity
to make sure the repos can roll over so that we don't have a
systemic collapse.
What we can't be, though, is faced with a Robson's
choice, as we were in the fall 2008, with either going to a process where there could be, if there was not funding provided
by someone, going into a bankruptcy there would be a freeze
up of the ability to continue closing a settlement on these contracts. In that situation, you would have dumping of collateral
on the market because there would be no liquidity, and you
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could have a market collapse. If you are faced with that choice
or you are faced with the choice of doing some kind of bailout
using whatever interpretations of statutes that may have been
necessary to prevent that type of systemic collapse, you are going to take whatever efforts necessary as a policy-maker.
I'd like to think that the United States has a certain
amount of moral rectitude but we have proven that we are not
going to sit there and let the system collapse as a result of
trying to make sure that we're morally correct. The policymakers are going to make the judgment of providing a bailout.
We need a mechanism though that if you have to pay some
sort of support for some types of claimants, that you're not
providing support for the shareholders and other types of
claimants that aren't necessary to protect the system from collapse. Is that an easy judgment to make overnight? No, its
not. But, just as we have done with bridge banks in the past,
sometimes you've got to make transfers over to the bridge
bank for short term, but then you can also take some actions
to make sure that creditors that are left behind in the receivership, that they will suffer the haircuts that you need to make
sure you impose. We're trying to impose the maximum number of haircuts, but it is not perfect.

Barry Adler: Ed, can you comment on what Mike talked
about and also give your view on how the current Bankruptcy
system as is or as amended might be structured to deal with
these problems.
Edward Morrison: Okay, let me try to provide some context for what Michael described. You can view the administration's proposal and the House bill as one response to a problem, but there are of course other responses. One alternative
is amending the Bankruptcy Code. Another is doing nothing:
leave existing law as is. Before discussing these alternatives,
let's talk a little bit about the problem.
The problem, in a nutshell, is that existing bankruptcy law
has some important limits. Arguably, it doesn't do enough to
deal with the problems faced by the kinds of institutions that
are currently outside the insolvency authority of the FDIC.
Firms like Lehman and AIG are eligible for bankruptcy protection, yet the bankruptcy laws are inadequate for dealing with
their kinds of problems. Bankruptcy is good for dealing with
the problems of a particular business but not the problems of

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business

248

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 6:241

an entire economy, and when you have businesses like Lehman and AIG failing, their problems are problems of both
their particular businesses and of the economy as a whole.
Part of the problem has something to do with what we call
the "safe harbors," which offer special protection to qualified
financial contracts, including repos, swaps, and just about any
other financial derivative that you can think of. These safe
harbors tell us that when a firm like Lehman fails, counterparties to the protected financial contracts are free to ignore the
bankruptcy filing. They are free to terminate and net-out their ·
contracts with Lehman and then seize collateral to the extent
that they are owed cash and can seize the collateral through
self-help. So, the safe harbors ensure that a Lehman or an
AIG or any business with a meaningful derivates portfolio is
subject to a feeding frenzy when it enters into bankruptcy.
Why have this special exception for financial contracts? It
was thought to be a system risk exception: by having this kind
of treatment for financial contracts, we protect our economy.
When a Lehman fails, the J.P Morgans and the Goldman Sachs
of the world can extricate themselves from their relationship
with Lehman and not be pulled down with Lehman. If the J.P.
Morgans and the Goldman Sachs were subject to an automatic
stay-and therefore barred from terminating their contracts
with Lehman and seizing collateral-they would be stuck waiting weeks or months for Lehman to decide whether it wants to
continue or terminate its financial contracts. The J.P. Morgans
and Goldman Sachs of the world would be forced to hedge
open positions and could potentially suffer massive losses. In
this way, Lehman's failure could infect its counterparties, generating widespread, systemic distress. Congress envisioned the
safe-harbors as a way to stem the infection. Lehman's distress
may cause it to implode, but Goldman and J.P. Morgan can
walk away with their collateral, relatively unscathed by Lehman's failure.
This story-that, without the safe harbors, Lehman's failure could infect other institutions and generate widespread
distress-is one theory of how markets collapse, but it's not
the only vision. What we saw in October of 2008 was a different way that systemic collapse can occur.
The safe harbors assume that parties like Goldman and
J.P. Morgan can extricate themselves from relationships with

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business

2010]

PANELJ

249

failing institutions and then move on safely. But there are two
things that can happen when a Lehman or other major market
player fails in a world with safe harbors. One is an obvious
knock-on effect: the safe harbors protect derivatives
counterparties, not holders of ordinary bonds or commercial
paper. So when a Lehman fails, it will default on its commercial paper and you may see mutual funds break the buck. That
itself can destroy confidence in the financial system and promote systemic distress. Safe harbors can't do anything about
this.
But there is something even more fundamental that the
safe harbors can't do: They can't deal with the problem of liquidity. When a Lehman fails, counterparties will exercise
their rights, as permitted by the safe harbors, to terminate
their relationships and seize collateral. But what does that
mean? That means they're terminating thousands of positions
simultaneously and selling off massive amounts of collateral simultaneously. Here is an example. When Lehman filed for
bankruptcy, it was party to about 1.5 million qualified financial
contracts with 8,000 counterparties. About 80% of those 1.5
million transactions were terminated in the two week period
after Lehman's filing. And that was considered slow.
Think about it: as a major financial institution fails, millions of transactions are being terminated by the counterparties, and treasuries and other types of liquid collateral are being seized out of margin accounts and sold. And everybody's
rehedging in order to replace the contracts that have been terminated. When you have mass collateral sales and rehedging,
you will see collateral prices drop precipitously and the cost of
hedging rise precipitously. This creates an infection, spreading the failure of one major market player to other players
throughout the financial system. Institutions holding the
same collateral will find their balance sheets declining in value
because tons of collateral are being dumped on the market.
At the same time, everyone will find it harder to hedge.
It's this kind of problem that we actually saw happen
when Lehman failed. It's exactly this same kind of problem
that prompted the Federal Reserve to intervene when Long
Term Capital Management failed in the late 1990's; the Fed
intervened to orchestrate a private sector bailout of LTCM, the
hedge fund, because it feared exactly what we saw when Leh-
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man failed: a systemic meltdown, notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors.
My goal here is to illustrate the point that bankruptcy just
can't deal with the kinds of problems that arise when the
Lehmans and AIGs of the world fail. I'm not saying anything
about the Lehman bankruptcy process. It may have been a
well-orchestrated, smooth-functioning event. You had the sale
to Barclays within a week (perhaps at too low a price-that's
being litigated now). But regardless of how smoothly the Lehman bankruptcy functioned, there was a major effect on the
marketplace. It's thought to have caused massive gyrations in
prices in the marketplace, and to have prompted federal intervention subsequently.
Back in the late '90s, during the LTCM bailout, the Fed
recognized the defects in our bankruptcy laws. Yet we did
nothing about it. We saw the defects in again in Fall 2008.
Maybe now we should do something about it.
There are at least four alternative approaches to the problem. One is to do nothing: leave the Code as is and add nothing new to deal with the Lehmans and AIGs of the world. Yes,
existing law has defects, but the defects aren't all that bad.
The federal government can always inteivene, as it did when
Bear Steams, AIG, and Fannie and Freddie found trouble. Indeed, even Lehman's bankruptcy. didn't have to happen. The
federal government could have inteivened and recapitalized
the investment bank. There are statements from Geithner and
Bernanke that the Federal Reseive felt constrained in its ability
to inteivene in Lehman's case, but there's some evidence to
show that may not be completely accurate. There may have
been effective ways to inteivene and prevent the meltdown.
Indeed, a virtue of current law is that it forces the government to inteivene in a very public way when a major institution craters. Think of Chrysler and GM. There was a sense
among government officials that a collapse of these auto makers would create a systemic meltdown. Although the companies did file for bankruptcy, the federal government managed
the bankruptcy process deftly. It was able to inteivene with few
constraints imposed by the bankruptcy court. Through its DIP
lending powers, the federal government forced Chrysler to
separate its salvageable and non-salvageable parts and sell off
the salvageable. Much the same process is contemplated by the
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financial reform bill in the House, which would separate a
non-bank institution into its salvageable and non-salvageable
parts. The House bill would transfer the salvageable parts to a
bridge or to a purchaser, maybe J.P. Morgan, and the nonsalvageable parts would be left behind and liquidated. That's
basically what happened in Chrysler's bankruptcy, and it also
happened at GM's. Maybe that's the template for what would
be done in a world where we don't do anything to change existing law. Put differently, through existing law, the government can use bankruptcy to salvage non-bank institutions in
much the same way that it salvaged Chrysler and GM.
The counter argument is that, with Chrysler and GM, we
saw the problem coming a mile away. It was very clear at least
a half year ahead of time that Chrysler was going down the
tubes; there was lots of time to plan. Also, the failure of
Chrysler and GM was not one that led to a massive loss of confidence in our economy. By contrast, it was widely feared was
that if an institution like Citibank or J.P. Morgan failed, we
could see widespread loss of confidence in our banking system. We actually saw that happening for a little while. We saw
Treasury interest rates fall to zero in Fall 2008. There was a
flight to quality when Lehman failed and AIG was rescued, because nobody wanted to hold anything other than government
money. So doing nothing might not be the best approach.
Another approach, proposed by the Republicans in the
House last summer, is to modify the Bankruptcy Code to make
it more amenable to the failure of a systemically important institution. That would involve the creation of a systemic oversight board of the sort that Michael mentioned. It would also
require Bankruptcy Code amendments to, oddly enough, get
rid of the safe harbors. Keep in mind that the safe harbors
were designed to deal with systemic risk, but new proposals
suggest that they may actually exacerbate the systemic
meltdowns.
Now, I have a feeling that the safe harbors are a red herring-that they don't really matter much when it comes to systemic risk. They may help in reducing the probability of a
meltdown far in the future, but they do nothing when you
have a clear and present danger of collapse. They're not going to help. Only infusion of new capital into the system is
going help-the kind of infusions we saw when government
inteivened with Chrysler and when it bailed out AIG. That's
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the only thing that's going to work. This means that proposals
to modify the Bankruptcy Code are little better than proposals
to leave existing law as is: both proposals will require government intervention when systemically important institutions
fail.
So we might want to consider a different proposal, perhaps one that doesn't force the government to wait for a fim1
to go into bankruptcy and then intervene. We might consider
a policy that allows the government to intervene when it wants
to and implement an "early rescue" when it makes sense to.
That's what is being proposed by the Obama administration,
the House bill, and the draft Dodd bill. The basic flavor of this
proposal is that it gives to the federal government all the powers that are now possessed by bankruptcy courts. The FDIC
can liquidate an investment bank through a receivership. It
can also conduct the equivalent of a Section 363 going-concern sale. It can take the failing institution, separate it into its
good and bad parts-the systemically important part is the
good part-transfer that to a purchaser or transfer it to a
bridge bank. The government could even impose a conservatorship-it's basically a reorganization, with old equityholder
kicked out and the government running the show. It's what
we are doing with Fannie and Freddie right now. So that's
what the Obama plan does and you can say that the primary
virtues of that are two things: speed and clear expectations.
When the FDIC is in control, things move very fast-you
tum around a bank overnight. Yes, Lehman moved fast; that
took a week. But as fast as that process was, it left considerable
damage to the market in its wake. Chrysler was considered
light speed; 30 days. But 30 days would be death if there is a
financial meltdown. The FDIC's speed comes from limited judicial review of its decision making. Its decision to put a firm
into a receivership is subject to review, but other decisions are
subject to little, if any, review.
Michael Krimminger: Caveat time, but we can talk about

that later.
Edward Morrison: Maybe I'm being extreme, but I think
there's case law to show that there is very lightjudicial review
of most FDIC decisions, in contrast to bankruptcy court decisions.
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There are also clear expectations; it is clear ahead of time
in the Obama plan that you have a regulator ex-ante who is
telling everybody, "This firm is in good or bad condition.
Here is what the firm must do to be in good condition." Everyone knows who is going to be the receiver at the end of the
day, and this receiver can line up a buyer long before this institution is put into receivership.
The benefits are speed and clear expectations. The downside is that there is a lack of transparency: what is the FDIC
actually doing? How is it deciding who should get priority
among the creditors? How does it decide who's systemically
important? And when it separates the good and bad bank,
what are the priorities among creditors? In other words, the
downside is a lack of transparency.
In sum, one option is to do nothing, another is to amend
the Bankruptcy Code, and another is the House Bill. There's
still another option: link the Bankruptcy Code to the House
bill. Under this approach, everything in the House Bill would
remain the same except that the Bankruptcy Code would determine creditor priorities during liquidation of the nonsalvageable parts of the bank (the "rump" that is left behind
after the salvageable parts are transferred to a buyer). Once
the federal government has identified the assets and debts that
are not considered systemically important, these assets and
debts would be transferred to the bankruptcy courts, which
would apply ordinary rules to determine payoffs. We might
even require that the payoffs exceed some "liquidation baseline," to ensure that every creditor in the rump receives at least
what it would have received if the government had not intervened and the firm had been liquidated instead of rescued.
So we could think of the final option as being one that
tries to achieve a happy medium. But don't get me wrong, I
fully sign on to Michael's position that the Bankruptcy Code is
not an adequate mechanism for resolving the distress of systemically important institutions, at least not right now.

Barry Adler: Thanks Ed, and that perfectly leads into my
next question, which is for Judge Gonzalez. Can the Bankruptcy Code actually work pretty much as Mike suggests a resolution authority might? And my suggestion to you, Judge, is
that that's exactly what happened in Chrysler. The government came along, not to provide liquidity, but to rescue an
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industry. It came along with a bunch of money, decided who
was going to get paid and who wasn't, separated the firm into a
good part and a bad part, leaving you-and you're probably
still dealing with-the bad part, and sent the good assets on
their way without the encumbrance of the taint of the bad assets. And this was accomplished with a subsidy that permitted
you to approve it all. Is this a fair characterization in your view
of what happened in Chrysler?
Arthur Gonzalez: It's fair, but it doesn't emphasize the
openness of the process which I think is what's missing with
what I've heard as proposals, which will lead to a great deal of
uncertainty and concern about the closed manner of how
these things are going on. Chrysler ultimately did play itself
out. The parties that began it accomplished what they wanted
to accomplish in the separation of the assets. It was a very
open process. It was dealt with in thirty days, but there was a
lot done in thirty days. I don't envision any of these proposals
performing in any better way, and probably because of the
lack of this adversarial context you would have in these government-run proposals as you describe them, I see them being
bogged down. I see people being completely confused as to
who is going to take what, who is going to make an arbitrary
decision, and then what's going to happen. So I think the system needs to be fixed in the bankruptcy context to address the
concerns you raised, but I still would rather see it in that form
as opposed to a government agency running these kinds of
liquidations.
Marcia Goldstein: I agree with Judge Gonzalez. The
thought that we would put so much power and control in a
resolution authority, where decisions could be made without
transparency and without the opportunity for an adversarial
process, to me just doesn't sit well.

Barry Adler: Isn't this what the FDIC already does with
banks?
Marcia Goldstein: It does it with banks, and I represent
the holding company of Washington Mutual. I think tremendous amount of value was lost in the takeover, or turnover, of
that bank to J.P. Morgan. I'm not suggesting the FDIC doesn't
do a good job generally speaking, but the bank was trying at
that time to sell itself, and I think the competitive process did
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not occur. It was a middle-of-the-night takeover and the bank
was in effect handed to an institution that could have been
involved in the competitive process, but instead had been
lined up and standing on the sidelines. Maybe that was the
best way to go, and maybe that's not the example for all financial institutions when the FDIC intercedes.
I do think a bank is different because the FDIC is protecting depositors. I want to step back from that and suggest
something that might be considered a bit of heresy here.
What I heard-in terms of why the Bankruptcy Code doesn't
work and why we want to have a resolution authority-did not
address the bailout, because you still need liquidity in these
institutions, even if it's just for the good institutions, or the
good side of the bank or financial institution. So I think that
we're not free from the prospect of a bailout. We need to have
a way to provide liquidity, even if it's a federal debtor-in-possession financing. I think that was handled well by the government, in terms of General Motors and Chrysler.
I would like to talk a little bit about AIG, since I was involved in the crisis that led to the "bailout"-the $85 billion
bailout on day one. I do think that the safe harbors in the
Bankruptcy Code have proven to be a cause rather than a help
in terms of systemic risk. I think that the safe harbors as they
applied in the Lehman cases, as Ed described, created a global
run on a bank to the point that it led to a global infection in
terms of valuation of collateral. And if you think about that,
consider what happened to AIG. It suddenly became the subject of billions of dollars of collateral calls, because of the valuation of collateral. If we would have had an opportunity to
step back from that, and allow the situation to stabilize, that
situation may have come out very differently. One theory was
that had the Fed just stepped in and stood behind the collateral, instead of actually having to put up funds for the bailout,
perhaps there would have been some stability created in terms
of collateral value.

Barry Adler: How would it have stood behind it without
putting up the funds?
Marcia Goldstein: The government could have put up a
guarantee, which arguably equates to a funding. But perhaps
the guarantee would never have been called upon if there had
been some stability created. Also, let me talk about why AIG
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didn't file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy alternative was
considered versus whether to take the $85 billion.

Barry Adler: Well that didn't seem hard.
[Laughter.]
Marcia Goldstein: Well actually that is hard. In hindsight
it was the right decision given all the factors, and given what
AIG's options were. Clearly things occurred after that, for example, the restructuring of the bailout loan, which created a
great improvement in the circumstances of AIG, which supported the initial decision.
But why didn't AIG file for bankruptcy? One, it wouldn't
have had protection because of the safe harbor, in terms of the
financial products business. Two, the downgrades coming
from the rating agencies may be the villain here. It would
have led to a massive domino effect in terms of takeover of the
insurance businesses globally. In contrast, we did the res~cturing of SCA, now called Syncora-totally out of court, with
the full cooperation of the New York insurance regulator. We
were able to deal with all the counterparties. We were in communication with the insurance regulator every day. It's hard
to do that globally with an entity of the size and complexity of
AIG. If there were a provision in the Bankruptcy Code, in the
automatic stay, which provided for a temporary automatic
stay-some period of time, 45 days, 60 days, with respect to the
safe harbor-perhaps we could have had a stabilization and
time to go organize all the insurance regulators, and assure
them that these insurance companies were in good financial
condition. The run on the insurance companies that occurred
later, and later was stabilized, occurred because of the taint of
the AIG name, basically done more by the press than anybody
else. Given time, talking to the insurance regulators, organizing them, and establishing that those businesses wouldn't be
harmed, could have enabled the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Bankruptcy judges enter orders that govern the management of a company's cash all the time. We would have had
agreements with the regulators not to do anything to impair
the capital at those entities, creating stability. Had there been
takeovers of all of those insurance companies, we would have
had a Main Street systemic risk, where potentially the owners
of those policies couldn't borrow on them.
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AIG also owned a number of other businesses: AGF, very
similar to CIT, a huge provider of financings to small companies; ILFC, a provider of financing in the aircraft industry.
Those are perfect examples of companies that could be successfully reorganized in Chapter 11-but couldn't be. Why?
Because we couldn't even exercise what I would consider normal restructuring tools to deal with the debt at those companies; because if you successfully exchange debt for equity, you
get from the rating agencies an SD, a selected default, which is
a downgrade. Had that occurred, we risked the insurance
company domino effect. So while we could have probably accomplished some deleveraging at the AIG subs and improved
their debt profile, the lenders all knew we couldn't... so we
couldn't and it cost more money from the parent and the federal funds that were already there. So I think that my villain in
the AIG scenario is not the government-the FDIC had nothing to do with it-my villain perhaps is the working of the rating agencies. We have to have some way to deal with that for a
company like AIG.
For a company like AIG, even if we had some temporary
period, perhaps under the bankruptcy code, in which we
could go to the insurance regulators, we might also need a
temporary respite from an insurance regulator who can take
over an insurance company. Today, an action by a governmental authority to take over an insurance company is an exception to the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code. So
what would have helped AIG would have been a complete
standstill for a short period of time. I think that would have
saved money. Of course there is a lot written about the AIG
bailout as to whether it was really a bailout of AIG or a much
more systemic bailout.
Michael Krimminger: Like Goldman Sachs.

Barry Adler: Marcia, you mentioned the importance of
trying to save the sound operating companies or subsidiaries
of AIG. But on the question of systemic risk, AIG was deeply
insolvent. The speculative part of the firm couldn't have paid
all it's obligations, couldn't have met all it's insurance obligations, all it's derivative contracts, could it have? I mean you
could have waited as long as you wanted but unless someone
subsidized you, those were going to fail.
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Marcia Goldstein: It was the drop in collateral value that
impacted AIG's liquidiy and solvency. I think if you had been
able to use Chapter 11 we would have not had a run on insurance companies; we would have had a bankruptcy that affected
mostly the financial products business. We would have also reorganized some of their finance subs, ILFC and AGF, in that
process.

Barry Adler: The bubble burst.
Marcia Goldstein: The bubble burst, but we might have
been able to effectuate a bankruptcy at that level without impairing the insurance company values.

Barry Adler: Not the insurance companies, but AIG's.
Marcia Goldstein: Well, we had competing regulatory au-

thorities-

Barry Adler: But the counterparties on the derivatives
with AIG still would have suffered.
Marcia Goldstein: Yes, I'm not suggesting they would have
come out whole. They could have suffered, but that might
have been another alternative, and maybe the bailout could
have been a lot smaller.

Barry Adler: Got it. Okay, I am going to tum this over to
William Ackman.
William Ackman: Ok, so let me just excuse myself by saying that I am not a lawyer, but I am an active participant in the
capital markets so I will call myself a capitalist. We do actually
purchase and sell derivative contracts so I'll give a slightly different perspective.
Let's talk about financial institutions that don't have big
derivative portfolios. My general view of the world is that a lot
of tax payer money was wasted, thrown out the window in the
last 24 months, and it could have been avoided. I think the
best example of that is when the world started to fall apart,
among other financial institutions, CIT was determined to be
systemically important. The government put $2.3 billion in
preferred stock in CIT, and then about a year later decided
that CIT was no longer systemically important, and did the
right thing and said they are not going to put up any capital.
The management complained, the shareholders complained,
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the bondholders complained, and the government stayed
tough. And what happened?
What happened is the creditors got together and they negotiated a deal, unsecured debt converted into equity-about
$10 billion worth. The company did a pre-pack, filed, it
emerged 30 days later-it's listed on the New York Stock Exchange as a viable enterprise and no additional taxpayer
money was invested. That to me is what should happen.
In fact I think the bankruptcy code is a bit like the Constitution-I think they got it right the first time and it's really
some of the amendments they've gotten wrong. I really agree
with Marcia on this and others on the panel that the qualified
financial contract exemption is a huge mistake-and this is
from someone who actually buys derivative contracts! I think
that it doesn't create any meaningful market value. You've got
to be careful who you contract with, and I think that derivative
contracts should be treated like any other secured or unsecured creditors depending on how your particular contracts
are written.
What's interesting is that Lehman, as an example, didn't
require any incremental capital. It wouldn't have required any
government support in order to have emerged successfully if it
had simply done a CIT-like restructuring. Despite the disastrous handling of the Lehman situation, even with this exemption and all these contracts being terminated at the absolute bottom of the market, the unsecured creditors of Lehman
are still going to make a meaningful recovery. What that
means is that if the bondholders had gotten together and negotiated a transaction without the overnight failure of the institution, they could have ended up in a much better position
than they ended up now, without any need for taxpayer
money.
If you look at Fannie and Freddie, they have plenty of capital. They have way more capital than they need. The problem is too much of that capital is in the form of debt and not
enough of it is in the form of equity. Instead of the U.S. government putting $400 billion into Fannie and Freddie, what
should simply happen is that the government decides it is no
longer going to support Fannie and Freddy. The bondholders
sit down and negotiate a transaction in which a meaningful
percentage of the unsecured debt of Fannie is converted into
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equity and so we have a solvent institution. And that's a really
good approach. It's capitalism and it doesn't require any subsidy from the taxpayers. It's fair, it respects the hierarchy of
claims, and it eliminates moral hazard. We don't have the
problem of the government deciding what the compensation
should be for the management of various financial institutions. We're back in business. And if Citibank tomorrow-I
think there's something like $400 billion in holding company
debt-if $200 billion of that converted into equity, I think the
shareholders could probably negotiate something where they
make a recovery better than where the stock trades today, interestingly enough. And you would have a strong financial institution. What I would do is make it so that they could not
pay any dividends or buy back any stock and you make them
overcapitalize.

Barry Adler: Why isn't that happening?
William Ackman: It's not happening because Bill Gross
the Bond Manager has too much influence with the Treasury
and the bondholder lobby has too much power. What we've
been doing is we've been taking taxpayer money and we've
been infusing it into Fannie and Freddie and Citi and others
and that money has been going out the door to pay interest to
bondholders. So, the farmer, the guy driving the pickup-truck,
the kind of guy that can win an election in Massachusettsthat guy is putting up money and that money is going to subsidize owners of bonds. It's completely un-American. It's totally
unfair. It's absurd and someone should be screaming about it.
You know all these systemically important institutions
were supposed to be set up with holding company structures,
and the systemically important institution was supposed to be
the subsidiary, and if the institution got into trouble, you
should be able to file the holding company preserve the segregated nature of the subsidiary.
I am of the view where I disagree with Marcia, I think AIG
should have filed for bankruptcy (the holding company). AIG
financial products had a bunch of people who bought $450
billion worth of derivatives-it filed. What they shouldn't have
done is kept putting up more and more collateral. They
should have filed and then you get a bunch of unsecured
credit, you sit down and negotiate with them. And, I have a
pretty front seat view of this because I actually bought some
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AIG stock when the thing blew up and tried-I'm what they
call an activist investor-I tried to see if I could negotiate
something with some of the derivative counterparties. I called
up UBS, I got the relevant people on the phone, and they were
willing to negotiate a haircut on their contract with AIG. I ended up giving up and selling my stock because as I watched
what was taking place, I though that there was no real prospect
for that happening.
So I actually think that AIG would be a much better off
institution had they filed and reorganized in a sensible manner, and so what if the counterparties for AIG financial products couldn't. If they terminated their contracts, so fine,
they've got an unsecured claim in AIG financial products. All
the real value of AIG is in the insurance subsidiaties-they're
segregated-the policy holders are safe. To prevent a run on
the bank, that is where I might say, number one, the insurance
department should come out and say they are completely segregated. Yes the companies have similar names, but if people
are concerned .about that, that's where I would have the government step in and provide a guarantee saying don't worry
policy holders, we're going to make sure that the problems of
the parent company aren't going to affect the subsidiary. And
so I just think that we've gotten away from classic capitalism.

Barry Adler: I'm going to ask you the same question that I
asked Marcia. Maybe I'm just wrong, but the concern was over
the problems of the parent companyWilliam Ackman: They should have let the parent company go. Who cares about the parent company? This is the
containing the systemic risk point.
Marcia Goldstein: The parent company was the guarantor
on all those hedges and all those contracts and that should
have been subject of some regulation. If you're going to have
a regulatory scheme that affects a financial institution like an
AIG, that owns significant insurance assets but also wants to
dabble in financial products, the parent company should not
have been allowed to guarantee those claims-because then
Bill is 100% right: we would had the ability to file the financial
products business and resolve those claims separately and we
would have been able to make an unqualified statement that
this was of no import with respect to the insurance business.
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Also we have the complexity of the regulators globally,
and nothing I heard in terms of the resolution authority gave
me comfort that we would be able to coordinate a global collapse. The problem with AIG is, we might have been to work
with the New York regulator because we've done so in other
situations, but we had no ability to predict how you're going to
deal with the regulators in China, Japan, Europe. This was
truly a global problem.
William Ackman: My point is, who cares about the AIG
holding company? So what: it owns an aircraft company, it
owns a financial products company, and it owns stock in a
bunch of important subsidiaries. So it's a shareholder, those
are the assets of the entity, you file the entity-big deal. And
you do the same thing at Lehman: you file the parent company, you convert debt into equity until we have a solvent institution, and we don't invest taxpayer money.
If there's a role for the government, it's to provide temporary guarantees to instill confidence. If you look at the AIG
financial products subsidiary, they had about $450 billion of
contracts. Three hundred billion were so called regulatory arbitrage contracts where the financial products subsidiary was
guaranteed a bunch of loans for European banks so they
wouldn't have to hold a lot of collateral against them. I don't
think they'll make any payments on any ,of those $300 billion
worth of contracts. But on a mark-to-market basis they had to
write a huge check because of all the stress going on in the
world, and money went out to these banks, and they got paid
for insurance-it's almost like you collect on your homeowners insurance even though there never was a fire; a complete
disastrous waste of money and resources. They would have
lost a little bit of money on subprime-$30-40 billion maybeand that's little in the context of what has been wasted, and
what has been lost, and the destruction of a great institution.

Barry Adler: So you two at either end of our panel, Marcia
and Bill, are denying the premise of systemic risk, at least with
respect to AIG's collapse. Is that correct?
Marcia Goldstein: I said that had we had certain changes
to the bankruptcy code we would have felt more comfortable
letting the parent go. We were concerned with collapse of the
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insurance businesses which would have caused a tremendous
loss of value.
William Ackman: If I got to play God here is what I would
have done: the problem we had is that Bear Sterns was saved,
and then moral hazard was set between equity and debt. So
the market was told, "Don't worry if you are an unsecured
creditor, or if you're a CDS counterpart or another investment
bank, you don't have to worry because we're going to flush the
shareholders, we're going to give 2 bucks, maybe 10, something like that and the bondholders are going to be safe."
That was the first mistake. What they should have done when
Bear was on the brink of collapse was pull all the creditors in
the room and say "This is what's going to happen. We are
going to file this entity, unless we can come to a compromise-if we can't, we will file the holding company, and we're
going to convert debt to equity until we have a solvent enterprise." And even in Bear Sterns there is enough capital in the
holding company alone for there to be a solvent enterprise.
Once that took place, the whole world is going look at every
other financial institution to decide who is on the brink, and
they're going to negotiate debt for equity conversions until we
have a a solvent world. This whole holding company subsidiary debt equity hierarchy of claims all makes sense, and we
completely violated it. I'm not sure why-whether ignorance,
or politics, but I just think it was a disaster.

Barry Adler: Ignorance or politics as if those are separate?
Michael Krimminger: I think that it's important to make
sure that we're talking about the same thing and talking about
it from the same context as well. Our proposal, which is not
always perfectly reflected in legislation adopted by the House
or the Senate, is that you squeeze out any opportunities for the
government to provide any kind of guarantees to individual
firms. If the firm can't survive based on liquidity support then
the firm fails and is put into an insolvency process in which the
bondholders, the shareholders, and the creditors take the loss.
Any kind of liquidity assistance that would be needed in
this bridge firm would not be funded by the government. It
would be funded by the industry. We propose an ex ante
fund-a resolution fund that's paid by assessments on the industry to make sure that it's not going to be coming from tax-
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payer funds. If there is any shortfall, we take the money, shall I
say, out of the hide of the shareholders, bondholders, and up
the priority scheme, and ultimately that will be paid by the industry on the back-end as well.
As far as the issue of transparency, I think is a little bit of a
misperception as well. Even in the FDIC receivership for
banks, there is a full right of anyone who feels they are not
treated fairly in their claim to go to court, challenge that claim
and it's de novo review. There is no deference at all to any
decision by the FDIC on the claim. In transparency, one of
the things we think is important, and I agree with Judge Gonzalez, is that you have a very clear layout of the priorities of
claimants. What we propose is a very clear layout of priority of
claimants-one that people can challenge and that there
would be regulations that specify what is going to happen in
any of these receiverships. So I think the idea that there is not
transparency in FDIC receiverships is not truly accurate.
As far as the bailout, liquidity support is very different
from AIG, it's very different from TARP, it's very different
from the bailouts that occurred in the fall of 2008. They occurred because there were really only two options as I pointed
out before: bankruptcy, which would create quite a bit of concern and a dry-up of liquidity after the Lehman bankruptcy-I
don't necessarily think that the Lehman bankruptcy filing itself created a loss of liquidity but I think it's fair to say that it
contributed to the loss of liquidity in the system. After that, I
don't think the regulators were comfortable taking that as the
other option besides the bailout, so they engaged in a lot of
bailout activity. We want to end that kind of bailout activity. An
important issue is to make sure that parties do take haircuts
whenever you can make them take a haircut and not expose
the system to overarching risk of loss or collapse. That is really
the only time that anything other than a haircut on creditors
should apply. And again, our view is that bankruptcy should
be the rule for virtually any kind of institution, including financial institutions. Except for the very rare case in the middle of a catastrophic collapse, there needs to be some shortterm liquidity then make sure that shareholders and others
take the loss and there should not be guarantees of particular
firms' obligations across the board.
One last point is the issue about the temporary stay and
the idea of having federal guarantees. I am very concerned
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about the idea of federal guarantees, in part because of what
did occur. Looking at the options of going into bankruptcy
with the holding company, or doing some type of guarantee,
the regulators did agree to provide ring-fencing for certain
firms or holding companies. This was done in order to provide a guarantee that gave a backstop to help with market stabilization, if you will, of asset values to a degree, but certainly a
stabilization of those firms more specifically. That's what we
would certainly like to get away from; we want to get away from
those firm-specific guarantees.
Arthur Gonzalez: I still come back to the point: why can't
it be done in a bankruptcy court? We have the priority system
there; it can play itself out. If the government ·wants to provide
DIP loans for any bridge period, it can do that. Under the
Code, it can act as quickly as anyone else in a much more open
forum. So I don't understand necessarily why this should be
run, even the exceptional case, by a government entity. I
think it's much better to have the government entity on the
outside, with its regulations, making whatever it needs available for liquidity. In that methodology, you wouldn't necessarily be bailing out equity; you wouldn't be bailing out creditors
so much, you would just be maintaining the short term liquidity that is necessary from a system-wide standpoint, if that's the
choice of the government. I don't understand the need to create a whole separate enterprise to deal with this.
Michael Krimminger: I co-chaired an international working group looking at some of the lessons from the crisis. One
of the lessons that we drew from representatives of countries,
the G-20 and others, was that we needed a way to have a more
coordinated harmonization of national laws, so that we could
improve the ability to coordinate these types of insolvencies
and try to deal with some of the currently total unpredictability of the actions of laws in various countries. Despite the fact
that we have a globalized financial system, we have a very nationalized legal infrastructure for dealing with firms in distress.
What we saw in the fall of 2008 was that, with the uncertainty
involved and the lack of tools, there was a complete resort to
national solutions, which had some issues in a number of different insolvencies, including Lehman because of some issues
between the UK and the U.S. and some other jurisdictions.
But the reason, I would argue, bankruptcy may not be the best
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tool in these rare cases is the need for quick, decisive action,
where there needs to be an ability for someone to challenge a
claim later, but not stop the ability to take the action to make
transfers and sell assets immediately upon the insolvency.
Also, with a federal entity being involved in this process,
you have the ability to put in place regulations, do a lot more
pre-planning with foreign regulators, as far as how you will
deal with a future insolvency. There's a lot of discussion right
now about wind down planning, about trying to see what structures could be achieved internationally, to make sure that if
there's a crisis for a particular bank, or a bank holding company, or financial firm, that there would be a way of working
and coordinating these things. This process makes the firm
think about resiliency planning in a way they hadn't thought
about it before-how could you actually break up if you had
to. That type of planning can better be done through a regulatory process. But I think, fundamentally, it's the ability to
achieve immediate decisive action with funding from the resolution fund. Also the bankruptcy process, as I said, is wonderful for most insolvencies, but we're talking about that incredibly rare case where there simply is a need to provide additional
funding, and that funding should be into a system that has the
public interest, the systemic stability at heart, rather than just
mediating and liquidating and litigating creditor claims.
Arthur Gonzalez: You can have a transparent claims process, but the way you describe it, you don't have a transparent
transfer process. You're talking about the ability to make
transfers, which would not be transparent, and there's no look
back at that; it's over.
Michael Krimminger: There's transparency in the .sense
that people can challenge what has been done later. But that's
why I'd emphasize the bankruptcy process is what should apply
in everything except the very rare case. That's our goal, as
well. But, in that very rare case, there's a need for speed to
make those transfers without litigation of that issue before you
make the transfer, because you really don't have even a day or
two to do that in these cases.

Edward Morrison: I'd say that what's being proposed by
the House and by President Obama is not reinventing the
wheel. I admit that it might look that way. If you look at the
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House bill, you'll see a set of provisions dealing with preferences, fraudulent conveyances, and other matters that are virtually identical to the Code. But instead of reinventing the
wheel, the bill is shifting authority from bankruptcy judges to
the Fed and FDIC. You could say that all we're doing is changing the primary decision-maker. Instead of a judge, we have
the FDIC. To be sure, there is a downside to this change: the
FDIC is judge, prosecutor, and defendant all at once.
But there are very important benefits that outweigh this
downside. One is the speed of the process. You're right that
there is very minimal review, at least ex-ante review, of any of
the transfer decisions. That's the virtue of the FDIC process
and that's why it can happen overnight. So speed is very valuable.
Suppose we have a systemic risk regulator who identifies
systemically important institutions, imposes restrictions on leverage, restrictions on capital requirements, on trading. You
live in a world where the federal government is monitoring
firms and taking steps to constrain their activities. If you live
in that world, which kinds of firms will end up failing and
threatening our economy? Well, only those kinds of firms
where the government and the rest of the public had no idea
that they were as risky as they were. Their failure is a complete
surprise, or the people inside that firm were hiding stuff,
fraudulently, and we still are surprised. But in a world where
we're surprised, and markets are surprised, that's where you
have to act very, very quickly. So speed can be very, very important. The second part is the global process. You need a
global solution to most of these problems, and the hope is that
putting the authority in the executive branch creates a greater
hope for international cooperation than putting the authority
in the judicial system. That's just a claim.
But then one final interesting issue-and I'm not sure
how it gets resolved-is how do you start the process? How do
you commence the case? If you have the FDIC resolution authority, it's started whenever the FDIC feels like it's time to
pull the trigger. We could have a situation where the government's gun shy and it takes too long to intervene, or we might
have a trigger happy government. But any regulation is going
to have those two kinds of problems.
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If the FDIC doesn't have authority to commence a case,
well how does it start? You might worry that fraudulent insiders are going to delay the case until it's really too late to take
the right intervention. You could give the government power
to bring an involuntary bankruptcy filing, but, frankly, an involuntary filing could be a bad thing. Just commencing a case
sends a bad signal to the market at just the time when it's not
appropriate to send that kind of signal.
I also want to make one point about what Mr. Ackman
said. I get the impression, Mr. Ackman, that you sense that
although we experienced a moment of systemic meltdown in
fall of 2008, it was a moment that we created by bailing out
Bear Stems and Fannie and Freddie and thereby creating an
expectation of government largesse, which deterred creditors
from making the kinds of haircuts or offering the kind of cooperation that they might otherwise. I'm not sure, is that
right? We lived in an environment with correlated portfolios
due to a massive decline in housing prices that affected lots of
banks. We also had a lot of overleveraged banks. And so you
ask, if you have a series of firms that are suffering distress and
are going to demand massive haircuts-Bear Stearns, Lehman,
Fannie, Freddie, AIG, and it goes on-how many haircuts can
counterparties suffer before they too are infected and become
distressed? If you imagine a world where the portfolios of the
institutions are highly correlated, as they are in fact in the real
world, the failure of one institution will infect others. That's
really what we're calling systemic meltdown: many institutions
failing at exactly the same time.
William Ackman: What I would say is that one of the great
solutions to an over-leveraged world is a world in which there
is just debt for equity conversion until we readdress the leverage problem. It wouldn't bother me at all. All that happens
when you have debt for equity conversion is a change in ownership of the institution from one investor to another. It's a
change where the equity investor chose the capital structure
they had with the amount of financial leverage they had, they
were the beneficiary of the 40-to-1 leverage when prices were
going up, so they have to suffer the consequences when prices
are going down. The people who lent them money understood
what the risk was and have to bear the consequences associated with that. The fear is that ifwe don't save the bond own-
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ers then some insurance company might fail and that puts half
their capital in financial institution bonds, and that is a very
imprudent thing to do. What do you do with that insurance
company? You convert their debt into equity until they are solvent and then the system delevers very quickly and it doesn't
require taxpayer support.
Edward Morrison: I guess it's a speed of adjustment question. How quickly does the system adjust when Citibank has to
write down a lot of its assets, including the claims it has on
other institutions? Write-downs will deplete the bank's capital
reserves dramatically. It won't lend as much going forward.
William Ackman: I think its counterparties become more
solvent when they convert debt into equity, instead of the
other way around. My point is I don't think we are better off
now with the U.S. government effectively guaranteeing five
trillion of Fanny and Freddie obligations and having $180 billion in receivables with AIG and that company basically immolating. I think the system is better off when the people who
bore the risk are responsible for their actions and there is a
transfer of ownership to, first, the junior creditors, then the
senior creditors, then to the secured creditors, until we have
solvent institutions.
How do you get banks to start lending? There are financial institutions where it's questionable whether they are solvent based on their capital structures. If you convert sufficient
debt into equity where they were so clearly overly-capitalized,
the only way they could get a return on capital is to increase
assets; which would force them to make loans, which would
solve one of the problems we have in this economy, which is
small and medium sized businesses access to capital. The problem we have is that putting equity into an insolvent institution,
all you're doing is subsidizing a bondholder, and even the
management would be better off. If you own options today in a
bank of questionable solvency, you aren't motivated to stay
with that financial institution because you don't think your
compensation is going to be worth anything, so you leave and
you go elsewhere. All the best people leave-you have a brain
drain, and gradually the institution deteriorates. Whoever
thought of this whole bankruptcy thing and the hierarchy of
claims, they were smart and the further we have gotten away
from that, the worse the consequences. If you think about this
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from a political point of view, not only are the citizenry going
to be a lot happier when the bondholder that took the risk
suffers the consequences, but the management is going to be
better off, and the only people who would suffer are the people today that earned an excess return on bank holding company bonds and are receiving treasury-like risk because of subsidies from the government, and I have no sympathy for those
people at all.

Barry Adler: One editorial comment. This is gratifying to
me, because I have talked about what is now called living wills
for fifteen years, which would accomplish what you are saying
without the threat of crisis. It would be done quickly, if not
automatically, and that is something that Michael also referenced, so maybe that is something else that we could talk
about.
Michael Krimminger: I think, surprisingly perhaps, we
fully agree with the idea that with debt for equity conversions
bondholders should suffer the losses, and the taxpayers should
not be bearing any losses fundamentally. That is what we want
to make sure ends up moving forward. All we may disagree on,
and I'm not sure if we disagree on this, is that it may take time
for the debt for equity swap, and something may need to be
done in the interim. If the firm can't survive while it is negotiating the debt for equity swap without the system-wide liquidity
support that might be necessary at a certain time, then close
the firm, and you basically have debt becoming equity because
they get wiped out.
William Ackman: Let me be clear. I think, of all the government entities involved in the financial crisis, that the FDIC
has done by far the best job in how they have handled things,
largely because I think they have acted in the most commercial
manner, so I agree with what you said. I wish it had applied
more globally to other institutions-not just 300 smaller
banks, but also to the large ones as well.

Michael Krimminger: One clarification I want to make to
what Ed was saying earlier is that we have never asked for, and
never want to have, the sole authority to appoint us as receiver
for any nonbank, or even any systemic bank. We have always
said that needs to be done at least by what we refer to as the
three keys, which means the Federal Reserve, us, and the Trea-
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sury, in consultation with the President, or though some council with all of the regulators. We don't want that to be something we can do, so it would not be something we can simply
assert.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: It seems that, even though the
market is stabilizing, and banks seem back in the business of
making money, that the FDIC seems almost on a roll in terms
of taking over bank after bank, and I don't know if there is
going to be any end to it. Though the economic situation
seems to be stabilizing with respect to the banks, why is it that
the FDIC banks don't seem to be a part of that recovery process?
Michael Krimminger: Well, there is one thing to remember. We have had a crisis that built up with a huge bubble-I
wouldn't even call it underwriting that occurred in many cases
-with badly underwritten loans that are still on a lot of banks'
balance sheets. There is a lot of risk still on the balance sheets.
There has been a lot of recovery, the market has been stabilizing. Unfortunately, banks tend to be lagging indicators of crisis, so after the crisis ends things tend to come home to roost
on banks' balance sheets. There were some extraordinary actions taken for the largest banks, and they didn't close, but the
small and medium sized banks are the ones that are closing
and they are being subjected to the harsh realities of having
made bad judgments.
What happened, of course, is that the larger banks tended
to be the ones who originated, along with nonbanks - which
were at least half the market - many subprime and other bad
mortgages. What you saw with the medium sized and smaller
banks is they tended to get in on the boom by investing in
loans which were commercial real estate loans and development loans, and those loans take a little bit longer to go bad,
but they are now going bad, so, unfortunately, there will be a
substantial number of bank failures this year. But there is improvement in the market, and we are hoping the economy will
continue to improve-and if the economy does so, then the
number of bank failures will drop off much more quickly.
There are still some bad assets to work off the banks' balance
sheets.
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William Ackman: While we have someone from the FDIC
here, there are a couple of ideas I wanted to throw your way to
prevent this from happening in the future. Why aren't deposit
insurance premiums based on the risk of the institution? Is
there real differentiation between one price?

Michael Krimminger: It is. We only had that authority
starting in 2005, and in 2006 we got the regulations in place,
so for a long time, we didn't have the ability to make much
differentiation in risk. In fact, two weeks ago we put out a proposed rule which is going to put out an additional risk factorexecutive compensation-so we are asking for comment. You
can find it on our website, and we would appreciate comments
from everyone because what we are trying to do is make it as
detailed a risk-based premium system as possible. It is riskbased now, but we want to make it more reflective of actual
risk.
William Ackman: Alright, if the concern is "too big to fail"
institutions, why don't the capital requirements increase
meaningfully once a bank gets above a significant scale, so that
banks can make the decision, "Am I getting a sufficient economies-of-scale by virtue of being at this size to justify having to
carry around the weight of more capital, or do I separate into
two banks so I stay within the lower capital requirements?"

Michael Krimminger: Well, we would support that. In
fact, one of the things that we hope would be accomplished by
the Systemic Council that's been proposed in the House bill
and is included also in the Dodd bill, in the Senate bill, is the
ability for that council to basically say that, if a particular regulator is not imposing capital standards stringent enough on
particular firms that could pose systemic risk to the system, the
regulator must impose more stringent capital standards. We'd
like to see not only higher capital standards but an resolution
fund assessment for this firm that would be based upon the
riskier activities. One of the risky activities could be simply
mind-numbing complexity, which we've seen occasionally, as
well as a level of inter-connectedness that creates additional
systemic risk. So if you can pay the higher capital standards,
and the higher assessments, and still operate efficiently for
your shareholders, perhaps that's fine. But part of the debate
that's ongoing right now, as the President's announcement
yesterday illustrated, is whether that's still fine, whether there
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should be some real limits on the types of activities that some
firms should be engaging in and certainly our Chairman has
advocated in the past, that you should move some things like
proprietary trading or more risky activities outside of insured
banks because you shouldn't be funding it with deposit insurance.

Barry Adler: Because high premiums do not prevent
moral hazard. You can just keep cycling without regulation.
William Ackman: This sounds simple and silly, but I think
it's true. If AIG's holding company had a totally different
name from AIG subsidiaries-you know inJapan, it'sjustAIG,
so people didn't know who they had their policy from-but if
you had an entity, the holding company were required to have
a completely distinct name, not be advertised along with the
subsidiaries, but really was a segregation and rig fencing of the
systemically important part, I just think we wouldn't have a lot
of the fears about the runs because of the problems of the
holding company.
Michael Krimminger: I would really like is the world
which I learned about when I was in law school - where subsidiaries were really walled off in a clear way. I think one of the
things we've learned in the crisis is that the walls tend to be
very porous-both before a crisis and during a crisis-so it's
difficult to do that, but we need to make sure that there's a
clear separation of the types of activities that someone's engaging in with different subsidiaries. We obviously have an interest in making sure insured banks are protected from more
risky activities.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: My question is for Marcia and
for Bill specifically. Marcia touched on rating agencies doing
automatic downgrades when a company goes through a debtfor-debt or debt-for-equity, sort of dilutive restructuring exchange. My question for Bill is: in your view, from seeing the
markets on a daily basis, is there really an economic justification for such an automatic downgrade? What do you see when
you see companies coming out of an out-of-court restructuring
process with a more healthy capital structure, and does that
justify those kinds of rating agency actions?
And my question for Marcia is: in your view, what would
be the effect of the rating agencies' more rationally looking at
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the prospective health of the company's balance sheet versus
the fact there historically has now been some old news that
presumably people already know.
Marcia Goldstein: I think the SD rating is a silly rating
because when you do a debt-for-equity exchange you're de-levering and you're improving the balance sheet. You're doing
exactly what you should be doing to enhance the debt that
remains on the balance sheet. For the most part, from a company's standpoint, it would not care and just go ahead with the
debt restructuring because the rating is not going to have an
impact. Some of the creditors, in their lending groups, depending on who they are and what the impact of the SD rating
would do to their books, do care, but, it may not be a big deal.
For an AIG, it is a big deal, because that's starts the ripple,
with the insurance regulators. And so this juxtaposition of the
rating agency, with this SD rating, with the insurance regulator
having the ability, and perhaps in Japan, or wherever there
may not be an understanding of what's going on here, suddenly using that downgrade as the basis to takeover the insurance businesses, creates a bad effect which impairs the ability
to do effective debt restructurings, which require less capital
because you're de-levering. So I think the current approach of
rating agencies is a big problem that needs to be fixed. Certainly for institutions impacted by collateral calls and insurance regulators, these are huge impacts that impair a company's ability to effectively restructure.
William Ackman: And on the rating agencies, interestingly, President Obama talked yesterday about how banks,
were largely responsible for the credit crisis. I would argue
that the rating agencies were more responsible for the credit
crisis than the banks themselves. Had the rating agencies not
overrated structured securities, the banks could never have
sold them to people who were looking for low-risk places to
put capital., I get that banks certainly had their share of responsibility, but we're trucing the banks, we're trying to recover
everything from the banks, when we should be recovering
whatever we can from the rating agencies first, frankly. The
rating agencies generally downgrade a company after it files
for bankruptcy, that's kind of their strategy.
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Bany Adler: They can notice that when there's bankruptcy filing there's something wrong-they're really talented
people.
[Laughter]
William Ackman: Really what should happen, before a
company is converting debt into equity, well before that point
in time, the company's credit should be downgraded very significantly and then actually when the debt gets converted into
equity-so now the debt is in a better position in the company-the rating should be going up. So they've got it a little
bit wrong. They're terrible at what they do; they're a big cause
of the credit crisis. I have no economic position on the rating
agencies, I might even have some friends who work there, I
hope not, but they've done more damage, and there should be
more focus on the damage they've done and I wouldn't rely
on them for their credit advice.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: The CIT example is an interesting example, but I feel like it's removed from the context of
kind of the panic and the insanity of what was going on back
in the fall of 2008. I mean Professor Morrison mentioned
before, that Treasury Yields, I think, basically went to zero.
People were actually paying the government to hold their
money. And so, I guess that leaves me the question that well,
maybe it could have worked, but what if it did. What if people
didn't sit around rationally and work it out. The consequences, given the interconnectedness of all these institutions
were so catastrophic, at some point maybe you just couldn't
take that risk. I'm just not sure what the source of your confidence is, that all this would have worked out just fine and rationally.
William Ackman: The answer is that you could certainly
have done it first, right? That you could certainly have gone
around converting debt into equity, and if that didn't work,
then fine, write a five trillion dollar check from the taxpayers.
But, it's certainly worth a try. And, I think, had that happened-you know, Bear Stearns is going down, the equity
stock is two dollars a share, and you negotiate a deal. Bear
Stearns could have survived as an institution and could have
continued to employ the people it employed, if all you did was
took holding company debt and converted a lot of it into eq-
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uity. The equity holders would have lost something close to
what they lost in the purchase by J.P. Morgan, and the unsecured creditors would have actually had a chance to recover
a meaningful amount of their investment had the institution
done well over time. The same thing is true for Fannie and
Freddie. And then the message that was sent by that, if the
government is going to save every counterparty, then it's going
to cause the riskiest counterparties to go run around in order
to try to generate profits and enter into a lot of contracts right
before they fail. That's really what happened to Lehman.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have a question. You very
briefly mentioned the Chrysler bankruptcy and I just wanted
to see what your views of that are, because to my view that was
a very extreme example of unprecedented interference by the
executive branch. Or in the more general context, I'm just
wondering what effect that has on the general view of actors in
the market place?
Arthur Gonzalez: As far the influence of the government
upon the lenders from TARP, I think as a judge who presided
over it, there's no record of that, number one. Number two, I
think ofwe observed the actions of the banks who received the
TARP funding, they are the least intimidated group I've ever
seen in my entire life.
[Laughter]
They do what's in the interest of their institutions. The
government gave them billions of dollars, they didn't open the
credit market. The government complained, they still didn't
open the credit market. They improved their balance sheets
because that's what they thought their fiduciary obligations
are and were. As far as other actions they've taken, they've
continued to pay salaries in what they deemed is what's in
their interest in spite of the actions of the government and
complaints. So I never bought into that and there is no record
of it. But even as a citizen I never bought into this idea that
the government intimidated the bondholders to accept the
Chrysler deal. I think the action of the government in
Chrysler was a political decision. It's not a bankruptcy decision. Once the government comes in as the funder of the
transaction, they're the funder of the transaction and I rule on
the bankruptcy issues that come before me. I don't make political judgments of whether they should have done it,
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shouldn't have done, is it good for capitalism, is it good for the
markets-that is really not something that I believe should
have been ever brought before me, and so, and I think others
can comment on that.
William Ackman: I'll give a slightly different point of view.
But I actually ultimately come to the same places as the judge,
which is that absolutely there was enormous pressure brought
to bear onto the hedge funds and others. President Obama
made public statements which effectively threatened people
who didn't go along with the deal. But I think what happened
was that the Bush Administration did not want, at the end of a
difficult administration, the capstone to be the failures of the
bankruptcies of Chrysler and GM. So they punted Chrysler
and GM into the Obama Administration by providing uneconomic, unsecured credit that gave them the ability to survive
until February/March, at which point it became an Obama
problem. And then what the Obama administration did is
they re-characterized those unsecured loans as DIP loans, effectively. And I think the unsecured creditors ended up with
about what they would have recovered had it filed under the
Bush Administration, had the government money come in as a
DIP loan and had they been junior claimants. So I actually
think what ultimately happened, and to the Judge's credit, and
maybe to President Obama's credit, is what should have happened economically. It happened in an unusual fashion because of politics, but I do think the outcome is right. I do
think it's dangerous to the extent that the government intervenes and affects priorities of claims in bankruptcies, and two
similar claimants get different outcomes. But I do think the
laws of rough justice applied here, and what should have happened ultimately happened.

Barry Adler: You're not saying that the payments were the
same as if the government never intervened, are you? You
don't think the payments of the UAW would have occurred in
the private market, do you?
William Ackman: No, I'm saying that if Chrysler had simply filed without any DIP financing from anyone in the Bush
Administration, the unsecured, the bondholders would have
gotten less.
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Barry Adler: Chrysler unsecured creditors got nothing, except the UAW, but not from the bankruptcy, this is a more
complicated issueWilliam Ackman: No, no the bondholders have made a
recovery.
Arthur Gonzalez: The secured-

William Ackman: Yes, so my point is the secured bondholders got a recovery that was similar to the one they would
have gotten had the government money come in as a DIP
loan, as opposed to. . .

Barry Adler: That's right, that's not what you said earlier.
William Ackman: Okay I apologize.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Can you address the effect of
mark-to-market valuations on the asset valuations and the way
in which they affect the rating agency devaluation, the acceleration of the illiquidity, the inability to trade. Why isn't that a
focus?
Michael Krimminger: I don't want to get into all the intricacies of mark-to-market accounting, trust me, but certainly I
think the bigger factor there is really just the lack of any kind
of confidence by anybody in any kind of valuation. So whether
you would do it under mark-to-market or not, there was a view
by the market place that they were too uncertain about the
value of any types of mortgage-related collateral, of mortgagerelated assets, and any CDO or other types of structured investment vehicle that appeared to possibly have any exposures to
these types of assets. So I think a huge contributor was that
there was simply a complete pulling back, and I think that was
reflected in the fact that virtually all funding seemed to go to
Treasuries because they were all looking for a safe haven. I
think that was just a lack of confidence in any type of other
funding. Many argue to this day about what parts of a firm's
balance sheet should be marked-to-market or how different
firms treat their balance sheets for accounting depending
upon their goals for particular assets. But I think that the fundamentally a lack of confidence of anybody in evaluation was
simply the biggest issue, much more than mark-to-market accounting.
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William Ackman: Just one quick thought on what I think I
understand your question is-the impact of mark-to-market
accounting on causing, and contributing to the credit crisis.
Interestingly, I think mark-to-market accounting is one of the
best means to prevent such a crisis in the future. What was
unique about the current credit crisis-the institutions that
created the systemic problem were given an exemption from
having to post collateral on mark-to-market contracts. If you
think about the institutions that have caused the credit crisisthe AAA rated institutions, ironically-it's the AIGs, the Fannies, the Freddies, the MBIAs, the bond insurers, the mortgage insurers. The AAA institutions under the terms of the
CDS contracts weren't required to post collateral. And so, the
CEO of AIG has this division that was just printing money.
They would collect premiums every month and never had to
put up any capital. So they were earning infinite return on
capital and it looked like the greatest business in the world,
allowing management to do whatever they wanted.
Goldman Sachs, on the other hand, manages risk so that
all their traders get paid based on a mark-to-market, including
the mark-to-market of their counter parties. So if you've got a
Goldman Sachs trader who had an oil contract with some energy company, and that energy company's credit worthiness
was deteriorating as their CDS contract is widening, the
trader's P&L would go down by the loss in value of that contract. The trader is incentivized to hedge that risk by buying a
CDS contract. So let's say they have exposure to Enron, see
that Enron is deteriorating-the trader is incentivized to buy
the contract. If you were a AAA institution that's not required
to post, there's no one disciplining you or warning you that
there was a problem coming.
So I'm a big believer in mark to market accounting. You
know, the hedge funds did not cause the credit crisis. And
part of the reason why they didn't cause the credit crisis is that
the investors were very close. The investors suffer the consequences, and also they weren't allowed to take risk they
couldn't afford to; they weren't allow to sell insurance on
which they could not pay because hedge funds were required
to post collateral with all the various counter parties.
So as long as there's a discipline requiring all the parties
in the system to post collateral with each other, mark-to-market is actually a very good mechanism to keep everyone hon-
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est. It's kind of the canary in the coal mine on upcoming
problems. It's when there's an exemption ...

Barry Adler: Alright then, I want to thank everyone on the
panel and in the audience.
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